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Constitutional Visions of Ethics and Culture
Anyone who has lectured on written constitutions knows how hard it is to
capture the magic of fundamental law. Specific clauses can be unlocked through
historical examples, but it is very difficult to lecture on the clauses themselves.
In America’s Forgotten Constitutions, Robert Tsai, Professor of Law at
American University and author of a variety of interdisciplinary explorations of
popular constitutionalism, offers eight well-drawn historical studies that largely
avoid clause-by-clause drudgery. With one important caveat, the result is a very
impressive, thought-provoking study of divergent forms of popular sovereignty.
The grand, serious idea that is at the heart of the book is that the 1787
Constitution tried to create a single nation (4) and a single people (9). This
assertion is repeated at least ten times throughout the text, supported with a
single reference to a Founding era thinker. (I could not find the short quotation,
cited in the first footnote, in James Wilson’s speech of Oct. 6, 1787. Perhaps
Wilson’s Dec. 11, 1787 speech is meant, although there Wilson rejects
consolidation.) Tsai’s America moves from a parochial revolutionary republic to
a liberal democracy with a “thin and inclusive civic culture" (255) and, through
visionary dissenters’ attempts to marry written constitutionalism and popular
sovereignty, part of the way back again. He employs a loosely-explained
framework of competing interpretations of popular sovereignty: conventional,
pioneer, tribal, ethical, cultural, and global. These are descriptions of utopian
experimentation rather than analytical categories, and, combined with further
descriptions of deliberative, expressive, and disciplinary constitutional functions,
help to explain the aims of these legal experiments.
The caveat is that Tsai’s account of our Constitution invites a degree of
confusion concerning the legal status of the Union, and thus about the aim and
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meaning of the Constitution. Drafted on the backdrop of worries about
governmental consolidation, the aim of the Constitution was a Union that was
merely “more perfect" than the flawed Articles of Confederation. In contrast,
Tsai’s Founding has the more demanding task of creating one people out of
many. The source of confusion is twofold. By ascribing to the founding a goal of
uniform national citizenship that was hatched, as Tsai acknowledges, much later,
under pressure from the Confederacy, and reintroduced by Croly et al in the
Progressive Era, Tsai makes 1787 an experiment in ethically thick
constitutionalism. He then chooses to read the 1787 Constitution as an
ideologically dominating, exclusionary document that “suppressed unorthodox
ideas of self-rule" (15).
Granted, both republicanism and liberalism can have compressive effects,
and Tsai’s book is mostly about constitutional culture after the founding. That
culture is too pluralist and too liberal for Tsai’s visionary dissenters (298). For
instance, American individualism is said to be part of a “plan" for political
consolidation that put “enormous strain" on dissident communities (81). But isn’t
this the same pluralism that allows constitutional experiments to unfold? Tsai
would undoubtedly argue that not all communities were on an equal footing at
the founding, and he is surely right, but his argument, which is largely contained
in a short prologue and epilogue, would have been strengthened by a fuller
account of the founding views of the strengths and weaknesses of the 1787
Constitution.
Any account of this book must judge it primarily by its historical case
studies, and these are uniformly insightful and remarkably even-handed. The
Republic of Indian Stream is an example of what Tsai calls pioneer sovereignty.
It is pluralistic, and presupposes a radically individualistic theory of economic
development. In contrast, the Icarian republic that was built by French socialist
Etienne Cabet is both perfectionist and accommodationist. Unlike the Indian
Stream republic, which was ultimately squeezed out of existence by existing
powers (Canada and New Hampshire), the Icarians were allowed to incorporate
under Illinois law and were outwardly obedient to state and federal authority.
The contrast between Indian Stream’s pioneers, absorbed by powerful
competitors, and Icaria, a perfectionist community that implodes through dissent,
is rather beautifully drawn, and provides insight into centripetal and centrifugal
pressures on constitutions.
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Tsai’s even-handedness is tested by his chapters on John Brown and the
Confederacy. John Brown’s Provisional Constitution is another ethically
perfectionist attempt to create a single, national people in open competition with
the 1787 Constitution. It is meant to operate in a counterfactual world where
slaves and whites have joined together in a violent war against slavery. The
attempt at armed insurrection fails, but Tsai admires the ethic. A “benevolent
constitutional vision" relying on the targeted use of violence is, oddly, portrayed
as a way of preserving “democratic dialogue." Tsai’s inference is somewhat at
odds with the subsequent discussion of a “more ambitious undertaking" of
“educating and organizing slaves" (108-9), which is dialogic and
liberty-preserving. In contrast, the Confederate vision of sovereignty is murkily
cultural, based upon regional distinctiveness and white superiority. For Tsai,
there is no ethically transformative content to the Confederate vision. This is
perhaps a defensible interpretation, but Tsai quotes Southern leaders defending
their order and slavery as natural and moral, and cites Fitzhugh’s obnoxious
argument that slavery improves Africans. This vision is ethical, even if it is
ethically misguided.
Even less satisfying as an attempt at cultural or ethical sovereignty, the
Sequoyah Constitution was developed after an earlier, unsuccessful attempt at
constitution-building in Indian Territory (the Okmulgee Constitution of 1870)
was rejected by the Indian population. Tsai portrays the Sequoyah Constitution,
like the federal constitution, as an attempt to build upon individual rights
(adding, in the case of Sequoyah, progressive economic commitments) and not
upon tribal sovereignty or an inclusive, dissident challenge to racial hierarchies.
It ended, like Indian Stream, in an act of political consolidation, but Sequoyah’s
institutional echoes remained in the Oklahoma Constitution.
The last three case studies are post-World War II, and illuminate the
promises and perils of ethical sovereignty. First in order is Robert Maynard
Hutchins’s Committee to Frame a World Constitution, which is an academic
experiment in taking conventional sovereignty to its logical conclusion: a
regionally-grounded, global republic. Although some version of an improved
UN had broad popular support in the US, it is formally rejected by Truman’s
State department and was a failure except in its deliberative and expressive
functions. The last two experiments consist of attempts at founding black and
white sovereign communities. The Republic of New Afrika is constituted by
followers of Malcolm X, and aims at black sovereignty over five southern states.
Tsai compares this republic to the Confederacy, but describes it as ethical rather
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than cultural because its Code respected the rights of internal minorities and was
committed to a communitarian ethical creed. Covington’s Aryans harbor a
comparable desire to establish a white-only homeland in three Northwestern
states, but they eschew direct mobilization, preferring to hide in plain view in
cities while deliberating and proselytizing online and through works of fiction.
Like the Icarians, they want their laws to reflect the people’s values, but, despite
sophisticated attempts to draft a constitution, theirs is a document still seeking a
people.
Some readers may be troubled to find that Tsai cannot or will not marshal
his resources to criticize racial and cultural sovereignty. In defense of this book,
it is about the big questions, even if Tsai's conclusion is overly modest. Tsai’s
insightful case studies suggest that good ideas and bad ideas are not easily
separated into the categories of visionary theory and practical failure, and that
both hope and reflection are needed for thoughtful constitutional dissent.
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